Articles 52, 53 and 54 of the Family of Code

The Family Code of the Philippines

Executive Order No. 209      July 6, 1987

        Art. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses and the delivery of the children’s presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of property; otherwise, the same shall not affect third persons. (n)

Art. 53. Either of the former spouses may marry again after compliance with the requirements of the immediately preceding Article; otherwise, the subsequent marriage shall be null and void.

Art. 54. Children conceived or born before the judgment of annulment or absolute nullity of the marriage under Article 36 has become final and executory shall be considered legitimate. Children conceived or born of the subsequent marriage under Article 53 shall likewise be legitimate.

           Under Article 52, the following must be recorded in appropriate civil registry and registries of property.

1.            judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity

2.            the partition and distribution of the spouses’ properties

3.            the delivery of the children's presumptive legitimes

If these are not recorded, then third persons shall not be affected. This means that whatever legal act performed by the spouses and their children will not affect the rights of other people with whom they may have transacted.

For example, a judgement on the nullity of marriage has become final and executory but the partition and distribution of the spouses’ properties are not yet recorded in the Registry of Deeds. The husband then contracts a loan from a bank. To secure the loan, he uses a parcel of land, which he and his wife jointly own by virtue of their marriage. The claim of the bank on the parcel of land is not affected by such declaration of the nullity of marriage since the partition and distribution of the spouses’ property is not yet recorded in the Registry of Deeds. The claim of the bank on the subject parcel of land is not diminished by the subsequent distribution and partition of property between the spouses. The bank can still foreclose such property as a whole in case the husband defaults on his payments for the loan he obtained from the bank.

However, to prevent such a scenario, the Supreme Court promulgated the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A. M. No. 02-11-10-SC). Section 2 provides

(a) The court shall issue the Decree after:

(1) Registration of the entry ofjudgment granting the petition for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage in the Civil Registry where the marriage was celebrated and in the Civil Registry of the place where the Family Court is located;

(2) Registration of the approved partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, in the proper Register of Deeds where the real properties are located; and

(3) The delivery of the children's presumptive legitimes in cash, property, or sound securities.

(b) The court shall quote in the Decree the dispositive portion of the judgment entered and attach to the Decree the approved deed of partition.

Except in the case of children under Articles 36 and 53 of the Family Code, the court shall order the Local Civil Registrar to issue an amended birth certificate indicating the new civil status of the children affected.

Under Article 53, the spouses whose marriage has been annulled or declared null and void, can enter into another marriage, provided that they have complied the requirements set forth under Article 52 as enumerated above. If either of the spouses subsequently contracts a marriage without first complying with these requirements, such marriage shall be null and void.

Under Article 54, marriages deemed null and void by virtue of the grounds provided for under Article 36 (Psychological incapacity) and Article 53 (non-registration of judgement to civil registry and registries of property) can produce legitimate child, if such child is conceived or born before the judgement on annulment or nullity of marriage has become final and executory. Because such child is considered legitimate, he/she become the perforce heirs of his/her parents whose marriage is either annulled or declared void. Such benefit is what Article 54 contemplates. The legitimate child would enjoy the same rights as those of other children that his/her parents might have with other legitimate partners.

Reference:

Albano, Ed Vincent (2017). Persons and Family Relations. Central Book Supply Inc.: Manila

-------------------------

by Permanent Class Number 4 in Persons and Family Relations, LSPU, First Semester, SY2019-2020

Date Last Updated: 29Nov2019

Republic vs. Javier

Nullification of Marriage Under Article 36 (Psychological Incapacity) of The Family Code

Republic vs. Javier

G.R. No. 210518, April 18, 2018

Facts:

            Martin Javier sought to nullify her marriage with Michelle Javier on the ground that both of them were both psychologically incapacitated as provided for under Article 36 of the Family Code. He submitted the psychological evaluations of Dr. Elias D. Adamos, with whom he underwent counselling for a year. However, the evaluation for his wife was only based on his narration and that of Jose Vicente Luis Serra, a common friend of him and his wife. Dr. Adamos’ diagnosis indicated that both Martin and Michelle suffered Narcissistic Personality Disorder, considered grave and incurable, and rendered them incapacitated to perform essential marital obligations.

Issue:

            Should the marriage of Martin and Michelle be declared null and void based on the findings of Dr. Adamos?

Ruling:

            Yes, but only for the findings on Martin. The Supreme Court held that Dr. Adamos’ diagnosis for Martin was sufficiently in-depth and comprehensive while the same was not true for Michelle’s diagnosis. While the Court yielded to the acceptability of psychological evaluations based on third-person accounts, the same should be viewed with extreme caution since third-person accounts of facts, particularly that of the husband seeking nullification of marriage, could be laden with biases. Moreover, Dr. Adamos did not interview anyone who could have sufficient knowledge on Michelle’s childhood, from which, the psychological incapacity was allegedly rooted. In Martin’s case, Dr. Adamos’ findings of the traumatic experiences with an abusive father was personally relayed by Martin.

            The Court held that Martin was indeed psychologically incapacitated. Thus, his marriage with Michelle was declared null and void. Further, the Court emphasized that nullification of marriage should still be determined on a case-to-case basis following the guidelines enunciated in Republic vs. Molina.

           

Article. 15 of The Family Code of the Philippines

The Family Code of the Philippines

Executive Order No. 209      July 6, 1987

Article. 15. Any contracting party between the age of twenty-one and twenty-five shall be obliged to ask their parents or guardian for advice upon the intended marriage. If they do not obtain such advice, or if it be unfavorable, the marriage license shall not be issued till after three months following the completion of the publication of the application therefor. A sworn statement by the contracting parties to the effect that such advice has been sought, together with the written advice given, if any, shall be attached to the application for marriage license. Should the parents or guardian refuse to give any advice, this fact shall be stated in the sworn statement.

            The provisions of Article 15 apply to those who are still of ages twenty-one to twenty-five (21 - 25) years when they apply for a marriage license. The said applicants are required to submit two sworn statements – (1) sworn statement that advice of parents of guardian has been asked; and (2) sworn statement of parental advise upon intended marriage. These sworn statements are to be attached to the application for marriage license.

If in case any of the applicants’ living parents would not sign a sworn statement stating therein that favorable advice is given, the applicants have wait for three months, common called waiting period, while their application is being published or made to known to the public. It appears that the law intends to inform the public that a couple is about to be married even though that one or all of their parents are not favorably advising them to get married. But the law allows the couple to get married anyway, after a three-month waiting period.

            If a marriage license is issued without satisfying the requirements under Article 15, the ensuing marriage remains valid but those responsible for such issuance can be held civilly, criminally and administratively liable as provided for under Article 4 of the Family Code. Violating the provisions of Article 15 is tantamount to an irregularity of the marriage license, a formal requisite of a valid marriage. However, such irregularity does not invalidate an otherwise valid marriage.

Reference:

Albano, Ed Vincent (2017). Persons and Family Relations. Central Book Supply Inc.: Manila

-------------------------

by Permanent Class Number 4 in Persons and Family Relations, LSPU, First Semester, SY2019-2020

Date Last Updated: 29Nov2019

Article 32 of the Civil Code

THE CIVIL CODE

RA. No. 386

Preliminary Title

Chapter 1

Effect and Application of Laws

Article 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:

(1) Freedom of religion;

(2) Freedom of speech;

(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication;

(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;

(5) Freedom of suffrage;

(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;

(7) The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for public use;

(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws;

(9) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures;

(10) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;

(11) The privacy of communication and correspondence;

(12) The right to become a member of associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law;

(13) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the Government for redress of grievances;

(14) The right to be free from involuntary servitude in any form;

(15) The right of the accused against excessive bail;

(16) The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witness in his behalf;

(17) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one's self, or from being forced to confess guilt, or from being induced by a promise of immunity or reward to make such confession, except when the person confessing becomes a State witness;

(18) Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishment, unless the same is imposed or inflicted in accordance with a statute which has not been judicially declared unconstitutional; and

(19) Freedom of access to the courts.

In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant's act or omission constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right to commence an entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil action shall proceed independently of any criminal prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence.

The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated.

The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his act or omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.

            In addition to echoing the basic rights guaranteed under the 1987 Constitution, Article 32 of the Civil Code specifically provides that moral and exemplary damages can be recovered from any public or private individual who may have directly or indirectly violated such rights.  Even if the violation of these rights does not amount to a criminal offense, the violators may still be held liable thru a civil action in which allegations are proven by preponderance of evidence.

       Articles 2217 to 2220 of the Civil Code provides instances when moral damages can be recoverable. As restated by the Supreme Court in Ventanilla vs. Centeno (G.R. No. L-14333 January 28, 1961): “Moral damages are recoverable only when physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shocks, social humiliation, and similar injury are the proximate result of a criminal offense resulting in physical injuries, quasi-delicts causing physical injuries, seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts, adultery or concubinage, illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest, illegal search, libel, slander or any other form of defamation, malicious prosecution, disrespect for the dead or wrongful interference with funerals, violation of specific provisions of the Civil Code on human relations, and willful injury to property. To this we may add that where a mishap occurs resulting in the death of a passenger being transported by a common carrier, the spouse, descendants and ascendants of the deceased passenger are entitled to demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the passenger's death.”

            Articles 2229 to 2235 of the Civil Code provides the definition of exemplary damages and the instances when the same can be recovered. In People vs Catubig (G.R. No. 137842. August 23, 2001), the Supreme Court explains the nature of exemplary damage: “Also known as ‘punitive’ or ‘vindictive’ damages, exemplary or corrective damages are intended to serve as a deterrent to serious wrong doings, and as a vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an injured or a punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct.  These terms are generally, but not always, used interchangeably. In common law, there is preference in the use of exemplary damages when the award is to account for injury to feelings and for the sense of indignity and humiliation suffered by a person as a result of an injury that has been maliciously and wantonly inflicted, the theory being that there should be compensation for the hurt caused by the highly reprehensible conduct of the defendant - associated with such circumstances as willfulness, wantonness, malice, gross negligence or recklessness, oppression, insult or fraud or gross fraud - that intensifies the injury.  The terms punitive or vindictive damages are often used to refer to those species of damages that may be awarded against a person to punish him for his outrageous conduct.  In either case, these damages are intended in good measure to deter the wrongdoer and others like him from similar conduct in the future.”

       For exemplary damages to be recoverable, the following requisites must be satisfied:

“(1) they may be imposed by way of example in addition to compensatory damages, and only after the claimant's right to them has been established;

(2) that they cannot be recovered as a matter of right, their determination depending upon the amount of compensatory damages that may be awarded to the claimant; and

(3) the act must be accompanied by bad faith or done in a wanton, fraudulent, oppressive or malevolent manner.” (Arco vs. Lim G.R. No. 206806 June 25, 2014)

       In the case law, FEBTC vs. Chante (G.R. No. 170598 October 9, 2013), a succinct definition of preponderant evidence is provided. Following the words of Section 1, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, the Supreme Court states that “preponderant evidence refers to evidence that is of greater weight, or more convincing, than the evidence offered in opposition to it. It is proof that leads the trier of facts to find that the existence of the contested fact is more probable than its nonexistence.”

Case Digest

MHP Garments, Inc. et al vs CA et al, G.R. No. 86720    September 2, 1994

Facts:

            MHP Garments, Inc. secured an exclusive franchise agreement with the Boy of the Philippines (BSP), to the sell to sell and distribute official Boy Scouts uniforms, supplies, badges, and insignias. The company was also given the authority to "undertake or cause to be undertaken the prosecution in court of all illegal sources of scout uniforms and other scouting supplies" as stipulated in the Memorandum of Agreement the company signed with the BSP.

           

            In October 1983, Larry de Guzman, an employee of MHP Garments, Inc. undertook surveillance and verified that Agnes Villa Cruz, Mirasol Lugatiman, and Gertrudes Gonzales were selling Boy Scouts items and paraphernalia without any authority. Then on October 25, 1983, accompanied by de Guzman, three men from the Philippine Constabulary (PC) seized the illegally sold items and were turned over to MHP Garments for safekeeping.

            The warrantless seizure ensued in a commotion and as result of which Cruz, Lugatiman and Gonzales were embarrassed and deeply humiliated. They “suffered sleepless nights, serious anxiety, and wounded feelings.”

Issue:

           

            Can Cruz, Lugatiman and Gonzales recover moral and exemplary damages from de Guzman and MHP Garments as provided for under Article 32 of the Civil Code?

Held:

            Yes. Cruz, Lugatiman and Gonzales can recover moral and exemplary damages from de Guzman and MHP Garments as provided for under Article 32 of the Civil Code.

Even though de Guzman and MHP Garments did not do the seizure themselves, they were held to account for their indirect participation and were ordered to jointly and severally satisfy the payment of damages. They did not do anything to prevent the violation of Cruz’ (et al) rights against unreasonable search and seizure. They even initiated the act that resulted to the violation. They cannot excuse themselves from liability even though the three PC men were not yet held directly responsible for the violation.

Anyone can be held to account for directly or indirectly violating the rights guaranteed in the Constitution and under Article 32 of the Civil Code.

Reference:

Albano, Ed Vincent (2017). Persons and Family Relations. Central Book Supply Inc.: Manila

-------------------------

by Permanent Class Number 4 in Persons and Family Relations, LSPU, First Semester, SY2019-2020

Date Last Updated: 29Nov2019

Article 4 of The Civil Code

THE CIVIL CODE

RA. No. 386

Preliminary Title

Chapter 1

Effect and Application of Laws

Article 4. Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.

Concept of retroactive or retrospective law

            A law is said to be retroactive or retrospective when it affects acts, relations, transactions or obligations that occurred or were incurred prior to the effectivity of such law. In general, laws are construed against retroactivity because doing so might result to arbitrariness, impairment of obligations of contract, denial of substantive rights and negation of vested rights. However, a law is not considered retroactive when its operation necessarily involves factual consideration of an event prior to its effectivity. Neither a law is considered retroactive when it provides for affected persons to comply before they incur penalties under such law.

General Rule

The general rule is that laws are prospective and not retroactive (lex prospicit, non respicit). Transactions, obligations or cases under the purview of a law are governed by such law only when it starts to become effective and not before. For example, the increase in wages of workers are within the purview of the Minimum Wage Law. When an increase in wages is mandated in accordance to the aforementioned law, then workers are only entitled to receive increased wages after the effectivity of the law. The amended law does not entitle them to recover from their employers the difference in their wages before and after the effectivity of the law as the law is applied prospectively.    

Statutes imposing penalties and liabilities, including usury laws are prospective. Doctrinal rulings of the Supreme Court are also prospectively applied.

In Co vs. CA (G.R. No. 100776 October 28, 1993), the Supreme Court has provided quite a long list of cases in which the principle of prospectivity of statutes and doctrinal rulings have been applied.

Exceptions to the General Rule

(Mnemonic Device:  PIERCER)

1. Penal laws when favorable to the accused who is not a habitual delinquent or a recidivist

“A statute is penal when it imposes punishment for an offense committed against the State.” According to Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, an accused or a convict can avail of the retroactive application of a penal law that is favorable to him/her as long as he/she is not a habitual delinquent or a recidivist. As stated in Article 62 paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code “a person shall be deemed to be habitual delinquent, is within a period of ten years from the date of his release or last conviction of the crimes of serious or less serious physical injuries, robo, hurto, estafa or falsification, he is found guilty of any of said crimes a third time or oftener.” On the other hand, Article 9 of the Revised Penal Code, defines a recidivist as “one who, at the time of his trial for one crime, shall have been previously convicted by final judgment of another crime embraced in the same title” of the Revised Penal Code. The provisions of the Revised Penal Code “may be given retroactive effect during three possible stages of a criminal prosecution: (a) when the crime has been committed and the prosecution begins; (b) when sentence has been passed but the service has not begun; and (c) when the sentence is being carried out.” (People v. Patalin, et al., G.R. No. 125539 July 27, 1999)

In People v. Patalin, the accused-appellants were found guilty of robbery with rape which was punishable by death when the crime was committed. While their case was being heard and has not reached finality, the 1987 Constitution took effect, which contains a self-executory provision that effectively abolished the death penalty and commuted the death sentence to reclusion perpetua under Section 19 Article III. However, death penalty was already imposed to the accused-appellants by a lower court. When the case was appealed, the Supreme Court nullify this penalty as a result of the retroactive application of Section 19 Article III, in full consideration of Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code. Reclusion perpetua were instead meted to the accused-appellants.

However, the case of the accused-appellants was again overtaken by another pertinent legislation, Republic Act No. 7659, which re-imposed the penalty, thereby creating a question again of imposing the death penalty to the accused-appellants. The Supreme Court held that a vested right, the right to suffer the lower penalty of reclusion perpetua has already accrued upon the accused-appellants by virtue of the retroactive application of Section 19 Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Since, Republic Act No. 7659 was not favorable to accused-appellants, it was not applied to their case retroactively, again in full consideration of Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code.

In short, when a penal law benefits the accused, it is retroactive; otherwise, it is prospective.

2. Interpretative statutes

“An administrative rule interpretive of a statute, and not declarative of certain rights and corresponding obligations, is given retroactive effect as of the date of the effectivity of the statute.” An administrative rule (RR 12-99) interpretative of Republic Act No. 8424 issued by BIR on September 6, 1999, was deemed to retroact to January 1, 1998, the date when Republic Act No. 8424 took effect (G.R. No. 197515 July 2, 2014).

3. Remedial and procedural statutes

             As cited in Primicias vs Ocampo (G.R. No. L-6120 June 30, 1953), remedial law is one “which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtain redress for their invasions.”

             Definition of remedial laws are found in Tan, Jr vs. CA (G.R. No. 136368 January 16, 2002) and reads as follow: “as adjective laws which prescribe rules and forms of procedure of enforcing rights or obtaining redress for their invasion; they refer to rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice. They include rules of pleadings, practice and evidence. As applied to criminal law, they provide or regulate the steps by which one who commits a crime is to be punished.”

             In Mun. Gov't. of Caron v. Carino (G.R. No. L-65894 September 24, 1987), the Supreme Court emphasized that “Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent.” In other words, the retroactivity of procedural laws only affects those cases that have not been decided with finality.

            Exception to the exception

“The rule that procedural laws are applicable to pending actions or proceedings admits certain exceptions. The rule does not apply where the statute itself expressly or by necessary implication provides that pending actions are excepted from its operation, or where to apply it to pending proceedings would impair vested rights. Under appropriate circumstances, courts may deny the retroactive application of procedural laws in the event that to do so would not be feasible or would work injustice. Nor may procedural laws be applied retroactively to pending actions if to do so would involve intricate problems of due process or impair the independence of the courts.” (Tan, Jr vs. CA, G.R. No. 136368 January 16, 2002)

In Tan Jr vs. CA, Tan Jr., the petitioner followed the old rules and decisions of the Supreme Court on exercising his right to redeem a parcel of land. However, the Court of Appeals (CA) applied the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure retroactively to determine the period in which the petitioner can rightfully exercise his right of redemption and as a result, the petitioner has lost this right. The Supreme Court, reversed this decision of the CA because allowing the retroactivity of such procedures would “result in great injustice to the petitioner,” who stood to lose his “right to redeem the subject lot and this right is a substantive right.”

4. Expressly mandated by the law

             A law operates retroactively when it so provides expressly. An example is the Family Code, stating in Article 256 that “This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.”

- Exception to the exception:

a. ex post facto law

Article III Section 22 of the 1987 Constitution prohibits the enactment of an ex post facto law. In People v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 101724. July 3, 1992) the definition of an ex post fact law is stated as “A law passed after the occurrence of a fact or commission of an act, which retrospectively changes the legal consequences or relations of such fact or deed. It is a law which provides for the infliction of punishment upon a person for an act done which, when it was committed, was innocent; a law which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was committed; a law that changes the punishment or inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed; a law that changes the rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than was required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the offender; a law which, assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes a penalty or the deprivation of a right which, when done, was lawful; a law which deprives persons accused of crime of some lawful protection to which they have become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or of the proclamation of amnesty; every law which, in relation to the offense or its consequences, alters the situation of a person to his disadvantage.”

“Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 which was approved on March 16, 1982, amending Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 by increasing from ten (10) to fifteen (15) years the period for the prescription or extinguishment of a violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, may not be given retroactive application to the "crime" which was committed by Paredes in January 1976 yet, for it would be prejudicial to the accused. It would deprive him of the substantive benefit of the shorter (10 years) prescriptive period under Section 11, R.A. 3019 which was an essential element of the "crime" at the time he committed it. To apply B.P. Blg. 195 to Paredes would make it an ex post facto law for it would alter his situation to his disadvantage by making him criminally liable for a crime that had already been extinguished under the law existing when it was committed.” (People v. Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 101724. July 3, 1992)                   

b. statutes impairing vested rights

As cited in Rep. vs CA (G.R. No. 92326. January 24, 1992), a vested right is “one whose existence, effectivity and extent does not depend upon events foreign to the will of the holder.” The Family Code requires that husband and wife must jointly file a petition for adoption for it to prosper but the Youth Welfare Code that is operative before the effectivity of the Family Code only requires one of them. It was decided that the Youth Welfare Code has vested such right to the wife to file a petition without her husband being a co-petitioner and this vested right cannot be impaired by the retroactive application of the Family Code.

5. Curative statutes

             Curative statutes are retroactive. “Curative statutes are enacted to cure defects in a prior law or to validate legal proceedings which would otherwise be void for want of conformity with certain legal requirements. They are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities and curb certain evils. They are intended to enable persons to carry into effect that which they have designed or intended, but has failed of expected legal consequence by reason of some statutory disability or irregularity in their own action. They make valid that which, before the enactment of the statute was invalid. Their purpose is to give validity to acts done that would have been invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws have been complied with. Curative statutes, therefore, by their very essence, are retroactive.” (Narzoles vs NLRC et al G.R. No. 141959 September 29, 2000)

             In Narzoles vs NLRC, the Supreme Court stated that the amended Section 4, Rule 65 of A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC is curative in nature. The rule provides:

“Sec. 4. When and where petition filed. - The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion.”

The rule is said to be curative as it addresses the confusion regarding the deadline for filing a petition for certiorari. Previous petitions in the CA were dismissed because of late filing attributable to the confusion on when the sixty-day period starts counting and the cases subject of such petitions were not resolved on their merits. In other words, the latest amendment to Section 4, Rule 65 of A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC seeks to cure or “to validate” a legal proceeding by simplifying the rules on the deadline for filing a petition for certiorari, consequently preventing the dismissal of petitions because of mere technicality. Since the rule is curative, it applies retroactively even for those petitions filed before the effectivity of such amendment.

6. Emergency laws under police power

             “Jurisprudence defines police power as the plenary power vested in the legislature to make statutes and ordinances to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people.” (Cruz vs. Pandacan Hiker's Club G.R. No. 188213, January 11, 2016)

             In Viuda de Ongsiako v. Gamboa (G.R. No. L-1867 April 8, 1950), one of the issues put into question before the Supreme Court is the validity of the “50-50” sharing of agricultural crops between a landlord and tenants. This tenancy agreement was entered into before the effectivity of Act No. 4054, known as "The Philippine Rice Share Tenancy Act,” as amended by Republic Act No. 34 that provides among other things that crops should be divided 55-45, in favor of the tenants. The Supreme Court held that the implementation of such law does not impair obligations of contracts since it emanates from the proper exercise of the state’s police power and briefly discussed that this exercise addressed the urgent need to ameliorate “the well-being of the conditions of the working man.” The Supreme Court also sustained the retroactive application of the law in view of the fact that it is a proper exercise of the state’s police power.

7.      Laws creating new rights

Laws creating new rights operates retroactively. In Castro v. CA, (G.R. Nos. 5097 4-75, May 31, 1989), the right to prove filiation by way of "open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child" was granted to a respondent. This right does not exist in the Civil Code but accrued to the respondent because of the retroactive application of the new Family Code.   

Summary

General Rule: Laws are not retroactive.

Exceptions to the General Rule

(Mnemonic Device:  PIERCER)

1. Penal laws when favorable to the accused who is not a habitual delinquent or a recidivist

2. Interpretative statutes

3. Expressly mandated by the law

              - Exceptions to the exception:

                       a. ex post facto law

                       b. statutes impairing vested rights

4. Remedial or procedural statutes

5. Curative statutes

6. Emergency laws under police power

7. Laws creating new rights

Case Digest

Castro v. CA, G.R. Nos. 5097 4-75, May 31, 1989

Facts:

            Benita Castro Naval was the only child of Eustaquio Castro who was not married to her mother Pricola Maregmen. It was clear in the records of the case that the Benita, Eustaquio and Pricola lived as a family until the death of Pricola. Eustaquio himself reported the birth of Benita as evidenced by local registry book of births even though the birth certificate containing the signature of Eustaquio was not produced. He was the recorded father in Benita’s certificate of baptism. He also gave away Benita in her wedding and still lived with him until his death. Benita was also able to produce a picture of the Castro Family, in which she was a part, taken during wake of Eustaquio.

Issue:

Is Benita Castro Naval the acknowledged and recognized illegitimate child of Eustaquio Castro?

Held:

           The Supreme Court gave equitable weights on the established fact and affirmed the correctness of the conclusion of the trial and appellate courts that indeed Benita is the acknowledged and recognized illegitimate child of Eustaquio Castro. To remove any doubt on this conclusion, the Supreme Court invoked the pertinent provisions of the Family Code, which could be applied retroactively when no vested rights would be affected.

           In the absence of “the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or an admission of illegitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned,” the Family Code allows to prove filiation by “the open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child.” This latter proof of filiation is clearly established in the case; hence, it was held that Benita Castro Naval is the acknowledged and recognized illegitimate child of Eustaquio Castro.

Reference:

Albano, Ed Vincent (2017). Persons and Family Relations. Central Book Supply Inc.: Manila

-------------------------

by Permanent Class Number 4 in Persons and Family Relations, LSPU, First Semester, SY2019-2020
Date Last Updated: 29Nov2019